Competition under Nonlinear Pricing

Marc Ivaldi and David Martimort

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1994, issue 34, 13-69

Abstract: Despite its great prevalence in practice, competition through whole schedules of prices as function of quantities remains largely unexplored. To deal with this question, the multiprincipal incentive theory is exploited to build a theoretical model of oligopolistic competition which is fitted to data on the French market of energy distribution. A distinguishing feature of our analysis is that in equilibrium, nonlinear pricing schemes depend on an aggregated statistic of unknown individual valuations for the different goods and on the rivals' contract parameters. The empirical results show that incomplete information plays a crucial role. Since estimates of the structural parameters are obtained, inferences can be drawn on the degree of product differentiation, the effectiveness of regulatory constraint and the levels of suppliers' price margins.

Date: 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20075948 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Competition under Nonlinear Pricing (1993)
Working Paper: Competition Under Nonlinear Pricing (1992)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:13-69

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().