Le 'dilemme des prisonniers': les arguments d'une coopération en information incompléte

Michel Cavagnac ()

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1994, issue 35, 1-19

Abstract: For a "Prisoners' dilemma" played in a cooperative and incomplete information context we look for individually rational, incentive compatible and equilibrated side-payments. We show that the existence and the characteristics of these solution transfers are strongly related to the information conveyed by the payoff vectors of the game itself. For the class of one shot games for which no "cooperative solution" exists and when these games are played a finite or infinite number of times (whatever the discount factor), we show that players can obtain more than the non-cooperative gain in the first period and the maximum collective profit from the second period on.

Date: 1994
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