Régulation par la production ou par l'intrant en présence d'incertitude

Philippe Bontems and Jean-Marc Bourgeon

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1996, issue 43, 181-193

Abstract: This paper deals with the relative efficiency of output versus input incentives schemes in a static principal-agent model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We define conditions that allow us to extend the result obtained by Maskin and Riley [1985] on the superiority of output contingent contract to the stochastic production setting.

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1996:i:43:p:181-193

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