Collective Location

Hubert Jayet

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1997, issue 45, 139-160

Abstract: We analyse location of a group whose members differ in their preference ordering among sites while collective action calls for a common location. The possible locations are Pareto-efficient and individually rational outcomes of a cooperative game with strategic combinations defined by the members' locations. Only members located on the same site engage in collective action. The solutions' set of this game is determined and the example of a small firm whose members leave in different places illustrates its structure.

Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Collective location (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1997:i:45:p:139-160

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