Choix de capacités et comportements stratégiques
Thierry Pénard ()
Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1997, issue 46, 203-224
This paper tries to give a theoretical foundation to the idea that symmetric markets are more collusive than asymmetric markets. To prove this idea, we use a non cooperative repeated game in which firms choose their capacities in a first stage and then compete infinitely in price in a second stage. We characterise the optimal choices of capacities at the equilibrium. We conclude on the antitrust policy lessons of these results.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1997:i:46:p:203-224
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