Enchères asymétriques: contribution à la détermination numérique des stratégies d'équilibre bayésien

Philippe Benilan, Michel Mougeot and Florence Naegelen

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1997, issue 46, 225-251

Abstract: In this paper, we drop the symmetry assumption in a model of first price procurement auction. We consider the case of two groups of bidders whose costs are drawn from two different uniform distributions. Conditions of existence of a common minimum bid are exhibited and bayesian equilibrium strategies of firms in both groups are computed. We show that these strategies can be written as the symmetric equilibrium strategies more or less a mark-up resulting from the asymmetry.

Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Enchères asymétriques: contribution à la détermination numérique des stratégies d’équilibre bayesien (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1997:i:46:p:225-251

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