Inequality and Stability

Antonio Barbosa (), Boyan Jovanovic () and Mark Spiegel

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1997, issue 48, 15-40

Abstract: A constitution remains in force so long as no party wishes to defect to the non-cooperative situation, and it is reinstituted as soon as each party finds it to its advantage to revert to cooperation. It is the rich, and not the poor segments of society who in our model pose the greater threat to the stability of the social order.

Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Inequality and stability (1996)
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