Fondements des concepts de solution en théorie des jeux

Olivier De Wolf

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1998, issue 51, 1-27

Abstract: In this paper we study the player's reasoning in normal form games. To this end we generalize the concept of objective correlated equilibrium distributions introduced by Aumann [1987] to the subjective case. We propose simple and easily interpretable axioms of the rational behavior dealing with these distributions of subjective correlated equilibrium. We then offer a common basis to different usual solution concepts and to the less known concept of strong rationalisability (Stalnaker [1994]).

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:51:p:1-27

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