Asymétrie de l'information, réputation et certification

Bénédicte Coestier

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1998, issue 51, 49-78

Abstract: A model of repeat purchases with moral hazard where firms can signal their quality through a costly test is proposed. We show that if the marginal cost of test is sufficiently low, in equilibrium with certification, high quality price is greater than marginal cost but smaller than the high quality price that would prevail without certification. A welfare analysis is conducted which discusses the impact of private and public ways of financing the certification process.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:51:p:49-78

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