Contraintes verticales et coûts asymétriques dans un marché duopolistique

Yves Nakache and Antoine Soubeyran

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1998, issue 51, 79-100

Abstract: We focus on the problem of double marginalization in pricing in an industry where competition exists at the upstream stage in a complete information context. Then from Bonanno and Vickers [1988] we know that a Franchise Fee contract (FF) is more advantageous for upstream firms than a Retail Price Maintenance contract (RPM); from Gal-Or [1991a] that a Linear Pricing agreement (LP) can be better for firms than FF and here, we give some conditions under which an asymmetric equilibrium, with one firm selecting FF and the other LP, can exist.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:51:p:79-100

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