Coopération monétaire partielle

Daniel Laskar

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1998, issue 52, 103-136

Abstract: The paper extends Rogoff's argument on counterproductive international monetary cooperation to the case of more than two countries and underlines that it can lead to an argument in favor of a partial monetary cooperation, i.e. between only a subset of countries. First, in a n-country model where each cooperative bloc contains the same number of countries, it is shown that partial cooperation realizes a trade-off between the cost of increased expected inflation and the gain of a better response to shocks. Second, in the three-country case, where the core is taken as the solution concept, it is also shown that "free riding" is being facilitated.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:52:p:103-136

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