Transition et stabilité politique d'un système redistributif

Jean-Luc Schneider

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1998, issue 52, 225-247

Abstract: In a simple overlapping generation model, transitional effects play a crucial part in the way a democracy chooses its level of income redistribution. This may explain some apparent inconsistencies such as policy reversals, long lasting instability, or overstability of suboptimal systems. Stable tax systems are almost always suboptimal. We also find that a democracy may exhibit a bias toward redistributional extremism.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:52:p:225-247

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