Withholding of Information as an Endogenous Entry Barrier

Juan Bárcena-Ruiz and Jesus Rubio

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2000, issue 58, 185-194

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the withholding of information from an agent by a principal for fear that the agent may set up his own business if he is informed. We focus on two points when studying this question: the power of the principal to control the information available to the agent, and the possibility that the agent may set up a new firm if he receives private information.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2000:i:58:p:185-194

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