La tarification hospitalière: de l'enveloppe globale à la concurrence par comparaison

Michel Mougeot

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2000, issue 58, 195-213

Abstract: This paper analyses hospitals' regulation when health care demand is quality responsive and when the providers can reduce their costs by an unobservable effort. Socially optimal policy is characterised. We show that the so-called "envelope policy" can imply allocative and productive efficiency for a given objective function and is dominated by a prospective price policy.

Date: 2000
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Working Paper: La tarification hospitalière: de l’enveloppe globale à la concurrence par comparaison (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2000:i:58:p:195-213

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