Appariements sur le marché du logement

Gabriel Desgranges and Etienne Wasmer

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2000, issue 58, 253-287

Abstract: This paper attempts to build a theory of rental housing markets in which search frictiona are made endogenous by a matching function between landlords and agents willing to rent. The rent is determined either according to a "Nash-bargaining" game between landlords and tenants, or fixed ex ante by the tenant. In both cases, we discuss the impact of the taxation of vacant apartments and show that protecting the tenants has an adverse effect on the outsiders, as on the labor market.

Date: 2000
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Working Paper: Appariements sur le Marché du Logement (2000)
Working Paper: Appariements sur le Marché du Logement (2000)
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