Risque de chômage, assurance complète et choix des ménages dans les modèles dynamiques

Arnaud Cheron

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2001, issue 61, 105-118

Abstract: This paper examines, in dynamic models, the decision rules of households who face an individual risk contingent upon an aggregate uncertainty. More precisely, the individual risk relies on the positive probability to be unemployed. We show that as much unemployment insurance contracts as collective risks allow full-insurance against unemployment: the marginal utility of consumption and the level of wealth for an household do not depend on its labor market state. We analyze the impact of this property according to preferences and, as well, show how the full-insurance result allows to derive households decision rules from a representative agent problem.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076272 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:61:p:105-118

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().