Évaluation de politiques de retrait des terres pour la régulation d'un marché agricole

Pierre-Alain Jayet

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2001, issue 61, 119-150

Abstract: The paper is devoted to the welfare analysis of voluntary and opt-out mandatory set-aside policies relying on the incentive theory under adverse selection. Differently from Bourgeon et al. [1995], farms are composed of homogeneous yield plots. Optimal regulation by price and set-aside leads to theoretical and numerical results for soft wheat and low quality wine markets. Price adjustment limits the social cost due to the producers' information rent involving redistributional transfers between producers, consumers and taxpayers.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:61:p:119-150

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