Fédéralisme et conflit distributif

David Spector

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2001, issue 61, 151-181

Abstract: This paper studies the conflict over income redistribution in a federation. If federal redistribution replaces national redistribution, then forming a federation leads to an increase in redistribution if a federal vote is held, but to a decrease if intergovernmental bargaining determines taxes. Also, the existence of federal taxation next to national taxation allows to separate international conflict from internal conflicts, and thus facilitates the expropriation of the minority nation.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:61:p:151-181

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