Status-Seeking by Voluntary Contributions of Money or Work

Norman J. Ireland

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2001, issue 63-64, 155-170

Abstract: An informal club has members who contribute to the production of a public good to achieve status. Contributions are either in the form of money or work. A signaling equilibrium is found where full separation occurs and efficient choices are made whether to contribute in terms of work or money. The quantity of public good supplied has no consistent relationship to the optimal quantity, but is more than in a simple Nash equilibrium without status-seeking.

Date: 2001
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