Families, Markets and Self-Enforcing Reciprocity Norms

Joel M. Guttman

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2001, issue 63-64, 89-110

Abstract: This paper studies the evolution of self-enforcing reciprocity norms in a developing economy with weak property rights. In the model, children are viewed as investments in old-age support. In order to increase support in their old age, parents attempt to instill preferences for reciprocity in their children. These educational investments create a nucleus of "reciprocators", inducing the remaining opportunistic types to mimic the reciprocators' behavior, in order to find partners in their market transactions.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:63-64:p:89-110

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