Property Rights on Environmental Assets and Capital Accumulation: A Coasian Perspective

Pierre-André Jouvet, Philippe Michel and Jean-Pierre Vidal

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2002, issue 65, 137-152

Abstract: We contrast private and public ownership of environment in their ability to internalize the negative externality associated to the urge of the environment in the production process. This paper constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and property rights on environmental assets. When environmental assets are privately owned, the long run social optimum can not be decentralized. When they are publicly owned, it can be decentralized by means of lump sum transfers between generations.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2002:i:65:p:137-152

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