Network Externalities, Coordination Failures and Non-Standardization
Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2002, issue 65, 195-218
In this paper, I show that several standards may survive in markets characterized by network externalities. This result is not explained by strategic choices in an dynamic context. It simply follows from a failure of coordination. In fact, I consider a two stage game. In the first stage, the firms choose their standard. In the second stage, they choose their production levels in markets in which network externalities in the sens of Katz and Shapiro occur. Subgame perfect equilibria characterized by non-standardization exist but are socially inefficient.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2002:i:65:p:195-218
Access Statistics for this article
Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer
More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().