Concurrence interbancaire et sélection des investissements

Alexis Direr

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2003, issue 69, 101-117

Abstract: I study how credit is allocated between investments when banks can choose the level of scrutiny at which projects are examined. Banking competition is shown to entail multiple equilibria including different level of screening and risk exposure. It is also corellary shown how banks may influence each other when deciding how tight the screening process should be. This may lead to conformism and explain why individual lax policies may degenerate into aggregate banking crisis.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2003:i:69:p:101-117

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