Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance

Bertrand Villeneuve

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2003, issue 69, 119-142

Abstract: ln the Rothschild and Stiglitz model, assuming differences in risk aversions may lead to unusual equilibrium configurations like multiple equilibria, equilibrium positive profits, or random contracts. We characterize the various types of equilibria and give results on the determinants of the equilibrium regime. We conclude with a few remarks on classical equilibrium concepts in insurance economics, and we suggest policy implications.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2003:i:69:p:119-142

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