Politique environnementale unilatérale versus politique bilatérale dans un modèle à deux pays

Yolande Hiriart

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2003, issue 70, 131-154

Abstract: In a two-country trade framework with uncertainly on the production costs and R&D outcomes, we analyze a unilateral policy aimed at incentivizing a domestic firm to find a clean technology. Under homogeneous Bertrand competition, we show that the trade policy is a perfect substitute to the environmental policy. When both countries intervene, a freeriding problem appears between governments as soon as they do not choose cooperatively their policies.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2003:i:70:p:131-154

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