Les offres non compétitives dans les enchères du Trésor

Raphaële Préget ()

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2003, issue 70, 155-179

Abstract: The objective of this article is to analyze the noncompetitive bidding mechanism used in Treasury securities auctions. Noncompetitive bidding consists in submitting a quantity without specifying a price. Noncompetitive bids are served on priority at the weighted average auction price. First, in a single auction model we compare discriminatory and uniform price auctions when bidders have a multi-unit demand. Then, a two-auction model allows us to decompose the impacts of noncompetitive bidding on primary bidders' competitive bidding strategies.

Date: 2003
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Related works:
Working Paper: Les offres non compétitives dans les enchères du Trésor (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2003:i:70:p:155-179

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