Régime de retraite et chute de natalité: évolution des moeurs ou arbitrage micro-économique

Claire Loupias () and Bertrand Wigniolle

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2004, issue 73, 63-99

Abstract: An overlapping generations model is examined, where fertility behaviors are endogenous. A PAYG pension scheme introduces an externality on fertility behaviors. The competitive equilibrium dynamics and the steady state are defined. Two instruments, pensions and child benefits, are necessary to decentralized the optimal stationary state. The comparison between the scenario of the model and historical facts shows that variations in welfare allowances may explain the totality of the decrease in fertility rates.

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Regime de retraite et chute de la natalite: evolution des moeurs ou arbitrage micro-economique (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2004:i:73:p:63-99

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