Couverture, coûts dagence et taille dune entreprise

Frédéric Loss ()

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2004, issue 74, 225-257

Abstract: This article analyses the hedging demand of a firm, where hedging helps to reduce the agency costs between stockholders and one or several risk averse agents. We show that when a merger between two firms implies less information, the hedging demand of the new firm is generally higher than the hedging demands of the firms before merger. This is due to the loss of information and because hedging allows to reduce the risk borne by several agents.

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20079088 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Couverture, coûts d’agence et taille d’une entreprise (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2004:i:74:p:225-257

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().