Stratégies de revente à perte et réglementation
Claire Chambolle ()
Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2005, issue 77, 59-79
We study price competition on a homogenous good market between a hypermarket and a small shop. The hypermarket also offers another independent product whereas the small shop is assumed to be geographically closer to consumers. We show the existence of an equilibrium where the hypermarket resells at a loss the good that the small shop does not offer. A loss leader banning law may in such a context lower consumers'surplus. We further explore some implications concerning French regulation by competition authorities.
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Working Paper: Stratégies de revente à perte et réglementation (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2005:i:77:p:59-79
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