Reforming incentive schemes under political constraints: the physician agency

Gabrielle Demange and Pierre Geoffard

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2006, issue 83-84, 221-250

Abstract: In many developed countries attempts to reform physicians payment schemes have failed. To analyze some of the difficulties, this paper studies reforms of payment schemes in situations such as the physician agency, where the quality of the good produced is imperfectly observable by the payer. We first study the situation, common in many countries, where physicians face a single scheme. We identify conditions under which no reform can both obtain the consent of a large proportion of physicians (political constraints) and improve patients welfare. We then study whether a menu of contracts, with or without cross subsidies, may solve the difficulties generated by the heterogeneity of producers practice.

Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: Reforming incentive schemes under political constraints: The physician agency (2006)
Working Paper: Reforming incentive schemes under political contraints: The physician agency (2006)
Working Paper: Reforming Incentive Schemes Under Political Constraints: The Physician Agency (2002)
Working Paper: Reforming incentive schemes under political constraints: The physician agency (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2006:i:83-84:p:221-250

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