Optimal regulation of health system with induced demand and 'ex post' moral hazard

David Bardey and Romain Lesur

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2006, issue 83-84, 279-293

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the joint regulation of health care providers and health insurance contracts in a framework which contains both induced demand effects from physicians and ex post moral hazard behaviors from patients. After defining a framework where these two kinds of behaviors can be compatible, we exhibit that contrary to what we can observe in practice, a regulation that contains incentives on only one sector may be dominated by a policy-mix regulation.

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2006:i:83-84:p:279-293

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