Genetic testing, income distribution and insurance Markets

Ray Rees and Patricia Apps ()

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2006, issue 83-84, 353-368

Abstract: In many countries, fears that genetic testing may lead to a "genetic underclass" have led to restrictions on insurance companies' access to genetic information. This paper first shows that such restrictions are Pareto inefficient. The real problem appears to be that in the absence of such restrictions, outcomes on health insurance markets would be very inequitable. This paper analyses income redistribution policies to correct this, when income endowments differ in a way that may or may not be correlated with risk type.

Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20079174 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2006:i:83-84:p:353-368

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().