Comment on 'Making Decisions in Large Worlds' by Ken Binmore

Fabrice Le Lec and Alain Leroux

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2007, issue 86, 47-53

Abstract: In this article, KEN BINMORE [2007] questions the relevance and robustness of bayesianism in game theory, and more generally in economics. He does not intend to cast doubts on the consistency of bayesian decision in some environments but rather challenges the idea that such a methodology could lay the ground for a general foundation of game theory. In other words, he contests the idea that bayesianism could be an appropriate answer to all kinds of decision issues. The remainder of this comment is structured as follows: first, section 2. we will recall briefly the author's argumentation; secondly. we will point out to some ambiguities in the critiques made by BINMORE (section 3), to eventually show that BINMORE being right on bayesianism might lead to a more radical, but not illegitimate, questioning of rationality in general.

Date: 2007
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