Allocation chômage: entre efficacité et égalité

Audrey Desbonnet ()

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2008, issue 90, 181-214

Abstract: This paper reconsiders the trade off between efficiency and equality of unemployment insurance in a job search model with precautionary savings. We show that a decreasing profile of unemployment benefits is able to reduce this trade off. It requires that unemployed agents receive generous unemployment benefits during a short period. In this case, the declining profile increases the search effort of unemployed agents without decreasing the welfare of the unemployed in the most disadvantageous position.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2008:i:90:p:181-214

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