Efficacité et compétences spécifiques des dirigeants: l'arbitrage entre incitations externes et incitations internes

Christian At, Nathalie Chappe, Pierre-Henri Morand () and Lionel Thomas

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2009, issue 93-94, 279-299

Abstract: This paper develops a principal-agent model of the firm in which shareholders give an incentive contract to a manager to limit the socially costly extraction of private benefits, and to induce truthful revelation of the manager's type. We assume a type-dependent reservation utility. More precisely, the manager has an outside opportunity depending on the magnitude of his specific skills. Three regimes emerge, characterized by different levels of private benefits and wages. We find that type-dependent reservation utilities can improve the efficiency of the allocation from the social planner's point of view, whereas shareholders experience ambiguous effects.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27917393 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Efficacité et compétences spécifiques des dirigeants: l'arbitrage entre incitations externes et incitations internes (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2009:i:93-94:p:279-299

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().