Collusion et anticipation: une analyse empirique sur un cas historique

Gil Montant

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2009, issue 93-94, 79-108

Abstract: This empirical analysis focuses on the impact of the economic cycle on firms' ability to sustain cooperative behavior within an explicit cartel agreement that existed during the interwar period in the Northern French coalfields. The basic model is based on Bresnahan (1982) and adapted to the coal industry. In order to identify the degree of oligopoly, we first assume the independence of marginal cost with respect to the basin's production and second, we study the case of a marginal cost depending on the basin's production.

Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2009:i:93-94:p:79-108

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