Réforme de la protection de l'emploi et performance du marché du travail dans un modèle d'appariement

Olivier L'Haridon and Franck Malherbet

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2010, issue 99-100, 247-284

Abstract: In this article, we evaluate the virtues of an employment protection reform which is based on a simplification of the red tape and legal costs associated with layoffs and on the introduction of a U.S.-style experience-rating system. To this end, we use a search and matching model à la Mortensen and Pissarides to show that such a reform improves both the design of employment protection and the performance of the labor market.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2010:i:99-100:p:247-284

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