Publisher's Announcements and Piracy-Monitoring Devices in Software Adoption
Eric Darmon,
Alexandra Rufini () and
Dominique Torre ()
Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2014, issue 115-116, 409-430
Abstract:
In this paper, we investigate the distribution strategy of a software publisher. The user adoption context is characterized by uncertainty about quality (experience good) and heterogeneous piracy costs. Users can purchase or get unauthorized/illegal copies (digital piracy) of the software during two periods (or not adopt at all). Between these two periods, users can acquire information through word-of-mouth. To maximize profit, the publisher needs to decide about price, quality and level of monitoring of piracy. We show that the software publisher can profit from accommodation a certain level of piracy of the product. We add to the literature by explicitly considering the opportunity for the publisher to cheat about future price and monitoring levels (misleading announcements). This strategy that is falsely permissive towards piracy, can sometimes appear more profitable. However, when the degree of sophistication of user expectations about the publisher's strategy increases, only a strategy that is permissive (with respect to piracy) with non misleading announcements remains robust.
Date: 2014
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http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.115-116.409 (text/html)
Related works:
Working Paper: Publisher's Announcements and Piracy-Monitoring Devices in Software Adoption (2014) 
Working Paper: Publisher's announcements and piracy-monitoring devices in software adoption (2014) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2014:i:115-116:p:409-430
DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.115-116.409
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