Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets

Olivier Bos and Martin Ranger

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2018, issue 129, 127-144

Abstract: A two period labor market is considered in which workers' quality is revealed in the second period. A signal ? revealed to either workers, firms or both at the beginning of the first period ? is correlated with the final quality. Under all assumptions about the distribution of information in the first period there exists an equilibrium in which firms only make offers in the second period and workers

Keywords: Unraveling; Risk Aversion; Asymmetric Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.129.0127 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets (2018)
Working Paper: Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2018:i:129:p:127-144

DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.129.0127

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