Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion

Francoise Forges

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2020, issue 137, 3-30

Abstract: This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study information transmission in static interactive decision problems, both when the agents monitoring information can lie (“cheap talk”) and when they cannot (“persuasion”).

Keywords: Incomplete Information; Repeated Game; Sender-Receiver Game; BayesianPersuasion. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B21 C72 C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2020:i:137:p:3-30

DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.137.0003

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