Economics at your fingertips  

Engaging in Wars of Attrition

Maxime Menuet and Petros G. Sekeris

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2022, issue 147, 79-100

Abstract: This article studies the incentives to engage in a war of attrition under both, complete and incomplete information. In our setup, a war of attrition can unilaterally be decided by any player, and if neither player engages in a war of attrition they each obtain some pre-determined payoff. Under complete information, we demonstrate that if players play pure-strategies, they engage in a war of attrition where one player will drop out immediately. In a mixed strategy subgame perfect equilibrium, no player engages in a war of attrition. Under incomplete information, players never engage in a war of attrition at the symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium. When allowing players to decide to initiate a confrontation we therefore demonstrate that there can never be a war of attrition with a strictly positive drop out time along the equilibrium path.

Keywords: War of Attrition; Conflict Initiation; Non-cooperative Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.2307/48684787

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().

Page updated 2023-03-26
Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2022:i:147:p:79-100