All-or-Nothing Monitoring: Comment

Bo Chen ()

American Economic Review, 2010, vol. 100, issue 1, 625-27

Abstract: Zhao (2008) presents an interesting "all-or-nothing monitoring" result for a multitask moral hazard agency problem with partial effort observation. We argue that the optimal contract based on the non-verifiable observation of the agent's effort in Zhao (2008) can be regarded as a limitation on the incentive schemes available to the principal. I then propose some arguably more appropriate approaches for analyzing such agency problems. (D82, D86, M54)

JEL-codes: D82 D86 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.625
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.1.625 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:1:p:625-27

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().