Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions

Benjamin Edelman and Michael Schwarz

American Economic Review, 2010, vol. 100, issue 2, 597-602

JEL-codes: D44 D82 D83 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.2.597
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

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