Morally Motivated Self-Regulation

David P. Baron

American Economic Review, 2010, vol. 100, issue 4, 1299-1329

Abstract: Self-regulation is the private provision of public goods and private redistribution. This paper examines the scope of self-regulation motivated by altruistic moral preferences that are reciprocal and stronger the closer are citizens in a socioeconomic distance. The focus is on the role of organizations in increasing self-regulation by mitigating free-rider problems. Social label and certification organizations can expand the scope of self-regulation but not beyond that with unconditional altruism. Enforcement organizations expand the scope of self-regulation farther, and for-profit enforcement is more aggressive than nonprofit enforcement. Enforcement through social pressure imposed by NGOs also expands the scope of self-regulation. (JEL D64, H41, L51)

JEL-codes: D64 H41 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1299
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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