The Law of the Few

Andrea Galeotti () and Sanjeev Goyal

American Economic Review, 2010, vol. 100, issue 4, 1468-92

Abstract: Empirical work shows that a large majority of individuals get most of their information from a very small subset of the group, viz., the influencers; moreover, there exist only minor differences between the observable characteristics of the influencers and the others. We refer to these empirical findings as the Law of the Few. This paper develops a model where players personally acquire information and form connections with others to access their information. Every (robust) equilibrium of this model exhibits the law of the few. (JEL D83, D85, Z13)

JEL-codes: D83 D85 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1468
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (132)

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