Helping Consumers Know Themselves
Emir Kamenica,
Sendhil Mullainathan and
Richard Thaler
American Economic Review, 2011, vol. 101, issue 3, 417-22
Abstract:
Firms sometimes know more about a consumer's expected usage than the consumer herself. We explore the consequences of this reversal in the information asymmetry. We analyze the consequences of making consumers more informed about themselves. While making consumers more informed decreases their expenditure conditional on a given set of prices, equilibrium prices may increase, offsetting the direct benefit of information. We discuss theoretical and practical issues surrounding so-called RECAP regulation that would require firms to provide each consumer with information about her own usage of the firm's product.
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)
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