Contracts versus Salaries in Matching

Federico Echenique

American Economic Review, 2012, vol. 102, issue 1, 594-601

Abstract: Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. (JEL C78, D86, J31, J41)

Date: 2012
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