Information Processing and Limited Liability

Bartosz Maćkowiak and Mirko Wiederholt ()

American Economic Review, 2012, vol. 102, issue 3, 30-34

Abstract: Decision-makers often face limited liability and thus know that their loss will be bounded. We study how limited liability affects the behavior of an agent who chooses how much information to acquire and process in order to take a good decision. We find that an agent facing limited liability processes less information than an agent with unlimited liability. The informational gap between the two agents is larger in bad times than in good times and when information is more costly to process.

Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Working Paper: Information Processing and Limited Liability (2013)
Working Paper: Information Processing and Limited Liability (2012)
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