Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments

Sylvain Chassang, Gerard Padro I Miquel and Erik Snowberg

American Economic Review, 2012, vol. 102, issue 4, 1279-1309

Abstract: We study the design of randomized controlled experiments when outcomes are significantly affected by experimental subjects' unobserved effort expenditure. While standard randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are internally consistent, the unobservability of effort compromises external validity. We approach trial design as a principal-agent problem and show that natural extensions of RCTs--which we call selective trials--can help improve external validity. In particular, selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment, effort, and the interaction of treatment and effort. Moreover, they can help identify when treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort expenditure. (JEL C90, D82)

Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments (2010)
Working Paper: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments (2010)
Working Paper: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments (2010)
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