Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs

Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin

American Economic Review, 2012, vol. 102, issue 4, 1446-76

Abstract: In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this class of problems. Under acyclicity, we characterize dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and obtain two general insights. First, a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently powerful groups. Second, efficiency-enhancing changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender. We use this framework to analyze dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views. (JEL D71, D72, K10)

Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs (2008)
Working Paper: Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs (2008)
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